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ABSTRACT 
 
The corporate insolvency affects many parties that have interests in the continued existence of the 
company or business and those interests may conflict and cause tensions between them. The 
existence of corporate insolvency law is associated with an attempt to balance the interests of those 
who are ‘stakeholders’ in corporate insolvency, such as creditors, employees, local community and 
the public. Whether the role of insolvency law is to focus on the creditors’ interest or whether 
insolvency law has more roles to play and wider range of interests to be considered under insolvency 
laws has pointed to the debates on the underlying principles such as the objectives and theoretical 
foundations of corporate insolvency law. In view of the importance of theories underpinning 
corporate insolvency law to a proper understanding of the objectives and principles of the law, it is 
necessary to review various theories of corporate insolvency. These theories are mostly constructed 
by scholars in the US and UK in their pursuit of finding the objective of corporate insolvency law. In 
order to uncover the real objectives or purpose and principles of corporate insolvency law by 
reviewing corporate insolvency law theories, the authors collected information through secondary 
data analysis. Sources of the data are textbooks, articles from law journal and law review also report 
of corporate insolvency. Considering that Malaysian law has been significantly influenced by the 
English common law, the theories and objectives as well as principles of corporate insolvency law in 
Malaysia is compared to theories and objectives in the UK. It is recognized that the difference in the 
underlying theories and objectives produced different types of insolvency principles and rules. This 
paper will examine the theories of corporate insolvency laws. This paper will also analyse and 
compare the objectives and principles of corporate insolvency law in Malaysia and UK.  
 
Field of Research:        corporate insolvency, theories, objectives and principles, stakeholders’  
                                        interest 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Corporate insolvency law is the law concerned with companies who are debtors and who are unable 
to repay their debts.  Insolvency law in the UK (and most Commonwealth countries like Malaysia), or 
as it is usually referred to, ‘bankruptcy law’ in the US has had a prominent role for many years (Keay 
& Walton, 2003 & 2008). According to American law “the term ‘bankruptcy’ in the sense of a legally 
declared state of insolvency applies alike to individuals and corporations” (Goode, 2005:p.1). 
Whereas in the UK and commonwealth countries including Malaysia, individuals become bankrupt 
or go into bankruptcy; insolvent companies, if they are unable to initiate some procedure for their 
rescue, might go into liquidation or winding up (Keay and Walton, 2008; Goode, 2005). If a debtor is 
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a company, corporate insolvency intrudes on an extensive diversity of interests and it affects various 
parties that have interests in the continued existence of the company or business and those 
interests may vary from creditors to other victims (like the employees) of corporate insolvency. 
Accordingly, if a company becomes insolvent, questions are asked regarding the action to be taken 
and the purpose of that action. Questions raised include should insolvency law be purely used to 
maximise returns to creditors as well as to protect their rights? Should the primary concern to help 
out the insolvent company of its difficulties so the company or its business or both could be 
rescued? Is the main issue to further the creditors’ interests as well as to protect interests beyond 
those of creditors like employees, customers and community? Should the law concern about the fair 
balance between the right of creditors, debtors and those parties affected by the corporate 
insolvency? In order to answer all those questions it is necessary to deal with the proper function, 
objectives and scope of corporate insolvency law.  This can be done by addressing the theoretical 
foundation of law governing corporate insolvency, despite some of the theories might be different 
from the current position of law, yet they will shed light on the key objectives and principles of 
insolvency law. This article examined the theories of corporate insolvency laws that have been put 
forward by US scholars and UK. It also analysed and compared the objectives and principles of 
corporate insolvency law in Malaysia and UK.  
 
2. Theories of Corporate Insolvency Law 
 
There appears to be a lack of developed comment on the theory underpinning corporate insolvency 
law in the UK, and it is even less so in Malaysia. One of the reasons for this was because the 
pragmatic way in which English law has developed (perhaps a similar factor that it is hard to identify 
theories on corporate insolvency for Commonwealth country like Malaysia). Interestingly, the 
position in UK and the Commonwealth is in stark contrast with the US where there is voluminous 
amount of scholarship proposing various approaches (Keay & Walton, 2008). Accordingly, there is a 
developed body of theory in the US. Such theory could be classified under six broad headings, 
namely the creditor wealth maximization and creditors’ bargain, the communitarian vision, the 
multiple values/eclectic approach, the enterprise and forum vision, the ethical vision and a menu 
approach, (Finch, 2009; Rasmussen, 1992). In the UK, the explicit values approach and authentic 
consent model are the theories advocated by the British scholars. The discussion starts by examining 
the main theoretical views to include creditor wealth maximization and the creditors’ bargain, the 
communitarian vision, the multiple values and explicit value approach as it is notable that some of 
the argument or issues advocated by these theories form the heart of the debate on insolvency law. 
Then the approaches put forward by other theorists that have scrutinized the issue of insolvency law 
philosophy from other perspectives will be discussed.  
 
2.1 The creditor wealth maximization and the creditors’ bargain (CWM and CB)  
 
According to the CWB and the CB theories the main role and objective of insolvency law is to 
maximize the collective return to creditors through compulsory collective system and to solve the 
‘common pool’ of assets problem arising from diverse claims to limited assets (Jackson, 1986; Baird 
& Jackson, 1984). It follows that rehabilitation of the corporate enterprise is not a legitimate goal of 
bankruptcy law except to the extent that it is intended to maximize returns for the existing creditors’ 
right. The CWM and CB approach highlight that insolvency law should play its role as a collective 
debt-collection device whereby the company creditors agree to a collective procedure to enforce 
their claims rather than procedure of individual action (Jackson, 1986; Baird & Jackson, 1984). The 
collective debt-collection system would increase creditors’ returns when the debtors’ assets seized 
by the creditors are more valuable if sold together as a going concern (than if they were disposed of 
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piecemeal by individual claims). Furthermore, compared to the individual claims the creditors would 
no longer need to waste resources monitoring the debtors’ financial estate, which would allow them 
to expect a more certain returns on their loans (Mokal, 2001).  
 
These theories emphasize that the insolvency law must respect the existing pre insolvency creditors’ 
rights (Baird & Jackson, 1984). It follows from this argument that the distribution to the creditors 
should be according to such rights, and new rights should not be formed. Therefore, insolvency law 
is not considered to concern itself to protect the interests of other than creditors affected by the 
failure of corporate enterprise (like the employees, managers, suppliers and local community) 
(Jackson, 1986; Baird & Jackson, 1984). In view of that, it disagrees if instead of secured creditors 
being awarded the full price of their rights under insolvency law, the state of law should react to the 
social problems that are caused by a corporate failure, as well as to prevent such outcome is worth 
the costs of trying to keep the firm in operation and justifies placing burden on a firm’s secured 
creditors.  
 
The CWM and CB theories argue that ‘fashioning remedies’ for all the damage brought by business 
collapse is difficult and beyond the competence of bankruptcy court, indeed the wide-ranging 
effects of the corporate collapse are difficult to measure (Baird & Jackson, 1984). It says that the 
problems produced by the business collapse are not bankruptcy problems, and if it is significant that 
failing companies keep running the business to protect interests other than creditors like employees 
or members of the community such duty to do so should be done outside bankruptcy law not from a 
special bankruptcy rule (Baird & Jackson, 1984). Therefore, if it is desired to protect non-creditors 
interests of the corporate decline for instance the employees, this should be done outside 
bankruptcy law for instance via labour (employment) law instead of the former to create a new right 
in the bankruptcy, but then the bankruptcy law should respect those rights given by the labour 
(employment) law (Baird, 1986). It can be seen that CWM and CB advocate a main feature of a 
market economy, if after all some business go wrong and keeping marginal firms alive may do harm 
than good. If investors are compelled to keep assets in a relatively unsuccessful business, it may limit 
the freedom of the same or different investors to use those assets in a different and more 
productive one. Furthermore, limiting the ability of investors to reclaim their assets may reduce 
their incentive to invest in the first place (Baird, 1986).  
 
2.2 The communitarian vision (CV) 
 
The communitarian vision emphasizes on a variety of constituent interests especially the public 
interest (Gross, 1994). This vision does not just take on board the creditors’ interests but the 
interests of others are also considered like employees, suppliers, government, customers and the 
local community (Keay & Walton, 2003 & 2008). Communitarianism regards individuals as being 
interdependent on each other and recognizes that it is incumbent on them to act in the best 
interests of their communities, even if doing so prejudices their own individual freedom (Finch, 2002 
& 2009). This approach permits the insolvency procedures to rehabilitate commercial enterprises 
where this would have a better result for the community in protecting jobs even at the expense of 
some other rights (Finch, 2002 & 2009). Change of pre-insolvency rights on insolvency was also 
allowed under the communitarian vision (McKenzie, 1999). The communitarian vision also argues 
that insolvency law should cater for the survival of organizations and to their proper liquidation. A 
major setback of this vision is the lack of focus necessary for the design of insolvency law because of 
the extensiveness of interests to which it refers (Finch, 2002 & 2009). It was said that there are an 
infinite number of community interests at state in each bankruptcy and their boundaries are 
limitless and it is not possible to delineate the community. Almost anyone, from local employee to a 
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distant supplier can claim some remote loss to the failure of once viable local business (Schermer, 
1994). 
 
A second problem of this vision is that, even though community interests can be identified, there are 
so many potential interests in every insolvency and choosing the interest worthy of legal protection 
is bound to create substantial argument (Schermer, 1994). Another drawback of the communitarian 
vision is that insolvency judges may not be the best person to decide on what should be, or should 
not be a community problem, and what should be the community’s best interest (Schermer, 1994). 
However communitarians might respond that judges inevitably and in all sectors of the law will have 
to make a decision on public and community interests, and to have an insolvency law especially for 
creditor protection is really not viable, and if community interest intrude on judicial decisions then 
this should be dealt with honestly and completely (Finch, 2002 & 2009). Furthermore, if there are so 
many community interests that could be taken on board and during such process might be 
conflicted among those interests it is for the courts to undertake a balancing exercise to resolve such 
conflicts, as that is what the courts often do in deciding cases (Keay & Walton, 2003 & 2008). The 
communitarian theory is said suffers from being complex, even though it is only due to insolvency 
itself is complex (Keay & Walton, 2003 & 2008). 
 
2.3 The multiple values (MV) 
 
The MV theory was made popular by Warren and Korobkin (Warren, 1987; Korobkin, 1991). They 
challenged Jackson and Baird economic account and their efforts to define bankruptcy law’s distinct 
function as a mechanism to collectivize debt collection and thereby maximize economic returns to 
creditors as a group (Korobkin, 1991). Unlike the CWM and CB theories that offer a single economic 
rationale, the MV has argued that “bankruptcy issues reflect various and complex empirical and 
normative concerns that cannot be reduced to a single theoretical construct” (Korobkin, 1991 
p.719). According to Warren (1987, p.811) what she offered is a ‘dirty, complex, interconnected view 
of bankruptcy from which I can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the 
factors relevant to a policy decision’, but she believed that her view is more realistic and more likely 
to yield useful analysis. She also suggested a policy that focuses on the values to be protected in a 
bankruptcy distribution scheme and on the effective implementation of these values assisting the 
decision-making process even if it does not dictate specific answers (Warren, 1987). As for Korobkin, 
what he offered is a competing normative explanation of bankruptcy law, which he called the 
“value-based account” and it seeks to explain bankruptcy law in all its aspects, both recognising 
what really makes bankruptcy law distinct and justifying bankruptcy law as a rich and complex 
system (Korobkin, 1991). According to him, bankruptcy law provides a forum in which competing 
and various interests and values accompanying financial distress, may be expressed and sometimes 
recognized (Korobkin, 1991). Bankruptcy law also creates conditions for a special kind of discourse, 
one that is fundamentally rehabilitative in character (Korobkin, 1991). The MV asserts that 
insolvency law should consider the distributional impact of corporate collapse on those who are not 
technically creditors and who have no formal legal rights to the assets of the business (Korobkin, 
1991).  
 
It has been pointed out that the MV approaches take a wider approach than Jackson theory of 
creditors’ bargain; such theory sees the implications of corporate decline are broader than just 
creditor’s interests (Finch, 2002 & 2009; Warren, 1984). Therefore, insolvency process as trying to 
achieve such ends as apportioning the consequences of financial failure amongst a wide range of 
actors, establishing priorities between creditors, protecting the interests of future claimants; 
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offering opportunities for continuation, reorganization, rehabilitation; providing time for 
adjustments, serving the interests of those who are not technically creditors but who have an 
interest in continuation of the business and protecting the investing public, jobs, the public and 
community interests (Korobkin 1991; Warren, 1987). It can be seen from here that the MV 
incorporates communitarian vision and subscribes to distributive rationales (Finch, 2002 & 2009; 
Warren, 1987). The multiple values despite its popularity and practicality still gives rise to a few 
substantial problems. Firstly, limited assistance is given to decision-makers on the managing of 
tensions and disagreement between different values or on the way trade-offs between various ends 
should be decided and second, there is always controversy in choosing which values to call upon or 
concentrate. There was also no core principles that emerge to guide decisions on such trade-offs or 
to establish weightings. Furthermore, the MV runs the risk of having all arguments as valid and as a 
result, guideline for practical decision-making is not enough and this could result in chaos and 
confusion (Frug, 1984).
 
In addition to these similar to communitarian approach there will be 
inevitable conflicts between ranges of interests. 
2.4 Explicit value approach (EVA) 
 
As noted, scholars in the UK have started to concern themselves with the normative theories of 
insolvency law. An EVA promoted by Finch, is one of the theories that provides an alternative 
approach to the existing theories. Initially, Finch introduced this approach after examining nearly all 
of the existing theories on the justification of insolvency processes and decisions. Finch evaluated 
the theories delivered by the American scholars and concluded that what fails to show from such 
discussion carried out is any inclusive view of the proper measures of insolvency law (Finch, 2002 & 
2009).  
 
Finch suggested that to enhance the search for measures in the light of such divergent visions, it is 
necessary to analyse further the purpose of a quest for benchmarks for insolvency law. Finch (2002 
& 2009) opined that insolvency process do affect the public interest because decisions are made 
about the survival or demise of the corporation and this decision does affect source of revenue and 
the public. In addition it was accepted that insolvency process remarkably affects the private rights 
like pre-insolvency property rights and securities could be frozen and individual attempts to impose 
other legal rights being restricted. Therefore, on both public and private interest reasoning, the 
power involved in insolvency process can be seen to be calling for justification (Finch, 2002 & 2009). 
It follows that Finch emphasizes that these justifications should have aspects for the protection of 
private rights and public interests. According to Finch the analysis of legitimacy of insolvency law or 
process one should take into account the propensity of a move to serve creditor interests 
simultaneously with its communitarian effects and she makes explicit a number of different 
rationales or grounds for justifying insolvency processes namely efficiency, accountability, fairness 
and expertise implications (Finch, 2002 & 2009). Finch pointed out that ‘efficiency’ refers to the 
securing of democratically mandated ends at lowest cost; ‘expertise’ refers to the allocation of 
decision and policy functions to properly competent person; ‘accountability’ refers to the control of 
insolvency participants by democratic bodies or courts; and ‘fairness’ considers issue of justice and 
propensities to respect the interests of the affected parties by allowing such parties access to, and 
respect within, decision and policy processes (Finch, 2009). 
 
The evaluation on the legitimacy of insolvency processes offered by the explicit value approach is 
distinct from the series of different visions discussed earlier. First, unlike CWM theory, which is only 
concerned with creditors’ interest and pre-insolvency rights, EVA takes on board the preference to 
further communitarian interests and to protect creditor’s interests. Second, EVA offers an 
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identifiable list of justifications that has relevance in assessing the legitimacy of insolvency processes 
namely efficiency, expertise, accountability and fairness. Such a list is limited as far as the relevant 
justifying arguments are arranged under the four rationales described by Finch. This differs from MV 
and CV where the list is open ended as well as lacking in precise benchmarks for justifying insolvency 
processes. Third, distinct from other visions, EVA makes clear to give legitimacy to the trade-offs of 
each party’s interest, the decision makers must weight and prioritise all the interests. 
 
Finch (2002 & 2009) emphasises that trade-offs therefore takes on board different interests in a host 
of insolvency processes and decisions. Those decisions must recognize the right and interests as well 
as the role played in insolvency by array of parties to include creditors (secured and unsecured), 
employees, company directors, shareholders, suppliers, customers and other commercial groups 
who are dependents of the company. Finch also admitted that explicit value does not offer a series 
of primary principles to which others can be seen subservient. However, such approach offers a 
foundation in the form of structure that provides guidance and direction in the development of 
insolvency rules and procedures. 
 
2.5 Other Approaches 
 
The authentic consent model (ACM) tries to overcome the problem of the expansive interest 
inherited from the previous theories. The model advocated by UK’s scholar sees that the extensive 
participation of those other than creditors under the insolvency law can be limited if only those 
participants who can argue that their interests affected or threatened by the insolvency issues in a 
way peculiar or special to corporate insolvency are entitled for the protection (Mokal, 2001). It 
seems that the benchmark to justify whether any parties other than creditors are governed by 
insolvency principles is by asking what makes insolvency law special to them. Thus, only those who 
suffer hardship because the company is insolvent and the grounds for insolvency as specified here is 
the inability to satisfy its obligation as they become due are protected under insolvency law (Mokal, 
2001). If those victims are affected not exclusively on this ground even though they suffer the same 
implication like the employees who lose their job, those claims should be made and protected under 
general law like labour law rather than the insolvency law itself (Mokal, 2001).  
 
The menu approach promoted quite interesting and different theoretical ideas on the role and 
purpose of insolvency law compared to the visions discussed earlier. The idea advanced by such 
approach is that a menu of bankruptcy systems which would require a company when it is formed to 
select from such menu the specific bankruptcy system it wishes to have if the company is facing 
financial difficulties (Rasmussen, 1992). It is thought that such a commitment mechanism would 
guarantee all potential creditors that their rights would be ruled by the same bankruptcy system as 
the rights of all the firms’ other lenders (Rasmussen, 1992). Yet it could be complex when the 
company opts for different bankruptcy regime from the place the company is formed with different 
values, system, jurisdictions, judiciary and experts involved that might bring disadvantage rather 
than benefit to the company. It is also possible that the company in financial distress will discover 
that the pre bankruptcy system chosen is not up to the expectation in terms of returns to creditors 
or the protection of shareholder interests or other interest.  
 
Another vision is forum and ethical, the former unlike many theories advanced by bankruptcy and 
insolvency scholars conceptualised insolvency process in procedural terms with an objective to 
establish a forum where all interested parties affected by the business failure monetary or not can 
voice their grievances (Flessner, 1994). However, such terms with the aims to form a forum with too 
many interested parties affected by corporate collapse whether directly monetary or not can voice 
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their complaint could be criticised on the infinite number of interests the law should cater under 
insolvency law and process. Meanwhile, the ethical vision suggested that insolvency laws fail to rest 
on an adequate philosophical However, such terms with the aims to form a forum with too many 
interested parties affected by corporate collapse whether directly monetary or not can voice their 
complaint could be criticised on the infinite number of interests the law should cater under 
insolvency law and process. Meanwhile, the ethical vision suggested that insolvency laws fail to rest 
on an adequate philosophical foundation in so far as the formal rules of insolvency did not take into 
account issues of greatest moral concern (Shuchman, 1973). It sets a benchmark to justify insolvency 
process and decision based on moral values (Shuchman, 1973). The ethical vision also argued that in 
laying the foundations for insolvency law, the moral worthiness of the debt and the size, situation 
and intent of the creditors should be given due consideration (Shuchman, 1973). The issue here is 
moral values could be very subjective and varied; for instance what is considered immoral in one 
place could be not immoral in another place. It seems that it is difficult to get agreement on the 
correct moral values. Accordingly, one can argue that the approach that insolvency law fails to rest 
on sufficient theoretical foundation unless the insolvency rules take on board issues of moral 
concern is not convincing.  
 
3. Objectives and Principles of Corporate Insolvency 
 
As mentioned previously in view of the importance of theories underpinning corporate insolvency 
law to a proper understanding of the objective of the law, it is necessary to review various theories 
of corporate insolvency.  These theories are mostly constructed by scholars in the US and UK in their 
pursuit of finding the objective of corporate insolvency law. It also has been pointed out that the 
objectives of insolvency law “have never been carefully and systematically articulated in case-law or 
by commentators” (Keay & Walter, 2003 p.22). As it is recognized that the purposes or objectives 
“depend somewhat on what theory of insolvency law is adopted” (Keay & Walter, 2003 p.22). 
Furthermore, those objectives developed the underlying principles on the approach to insolvency 
law. The following discussions   analyze and compare the theories and objectives as well as the 
principles of corporate insolvency between UK and Malaysia. 
 
3.1 United Kingdom 
 
3.1.1 Cork Committee Report 
The starting point of the objectives of modern English corporate insolvency law can be found in the 
statement of aims contained in the Cork Committee Report of 1982 chaired by Sir Kenneth Cork 
amongst others their task is to review the law and practice relating to insolvency in the UK which can 
be outlined as follows: (Cork Report, 1982; Finch, 2002 & 2009).
 
 
i. To recognize that the world in which we live and the creation of wealth depend upon a 
system founded on credit and that such a system requires, as a correlative, an 
insolvency procedure to cope with its casualties; 
ii. To diagnose and treat an imminent insolvency at an early rather a late stage; 
iii. To have regard to the rights of creditors whose own position may be at risk because of 
the insolvency; creditors whose own position may be at risk because of the insolvency;  
iv. To prevent conflicts between individual creditors; 
v. To realise the assets of the insolvent which should properly be taken to satisfy his debts, 
with the minimum of delay and expenses; 
vi. To distribute the proceeds of the realizations among the creditors in a fair and equitable 
manner, returning any surplus to the debtor; 
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vii. To ensure that the processes of realization and distribution are administered in an 
honest and competent manner; 
viii. To ascertain the causes of the insolvent’s failure and if and in so far as his conduct or in 
the case of a company, the conduct of its officers or agents, merits criticism or 
punishment, to decide what measures, if any, require to be taken against him or his 
associates, or such officers or agents; to establish an investigative process sufficiently 
full and competent to discourage undesirable conduct by creditors and debtors; to 
encourage settlement of debts; to uphold business standards and commercial morality; 
and to sustain confidence in insolvency law by effectively uncovering assets concealed 
from creditors, ascertaining the validity of creditors’ claim and exposing the 
circumstances attending failure;  
ix. To recognize that the effects of insolvency are not limited to the private interests of the 
insolvent and his creditors, but that other interests of society or other groups in society 
are vitally affected by the insolvency and its outcome, for example not only the interests 
of directors, shareholders; and employees but also those of suppliers, those whose 
livelihoods depend on the enterprise and community, and to ensure that these public 
interests are recognized and safeguarded 
x. To provide means for the preservation of viable commercial enterprises capable of 
making a useful contribution to the economic life of the country; 
 
 
3.1.2 Fundamental principles of corporate insolvency derived from Cork Report 
 
The underlying principles on the approach to insolvency law that could be derived from Cork’s list of 
aims are as follows:   
i. First, it aimed to promote the protection of communitarian and creditors’ interests.  Such 
values can be seen where it is included in Cork’s list of aims that insolvency law is to provide 
the means for survival of viable business and to recognize and safeguard the interests of 
creditors and those parties who are affected by the corporate insolvency (Cork Report, 
1982).  
ii. Second, Cork’s list of aims took on board that insolvency law should protect the diversity of 
interests.  This includes not only creditors but also shareholders and employees whose 
‘livelihoods depend on the enterprise and the community’ (Cork Report, 1977). Indeed, 
Cork’s statements of aims recognize that distributional issues involved the insolvent 
company where it highlights that insolvency has wider repercussions not only for those 
intimately concerned with the conduct of the business but also to other interests of society 
(Cork Report, 1982).  
iii. Third, despite no clear guidance being given by Cork on which interests and values to 
concentrate on and which should take precedence in the insolvency process, where conflicts 
between different objectives occur, broadly Cork’s formulation has made it clear that it 
emphasized the agenda of survival of the viable enterprise or corporate rescue. As noted, 
the Cork Report sees the function of insolvency law as being to cater for the continuation or 
rehabilitation of a viable company.  The aim of encouraging the continuation and disposal of 
a corporate debtor’s business as a going concern in order to preserve the jobs of at least 
some of the employees is considered a starting point on the promotion of ‘rescue culture’ in 
the UK (Cork Report, 1982).  
iv.  Fourth, the Cork arrangement of aims of the insolvency process and decisions is established 
according to the four particular rationales to support insolvency rules, namely efficiency, 
accountability, fairness and expertise (Finch, 2002 & 2009). The application of the explicit 
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values that emphasize trade offs between different ends revealed that Cork’s formulation 
has no explicit explanation on the need of those objectives to be traded off and weighed up 
amongst each other, and no clear assertion in terms of the priorities for the protection of 
different interests in insolvency. However, the tradeoff issues absent in Cork do remain ‘a 
problem and one cannot expect easy answers when dealing with a process whose essence is 
the balancing of multiple objectives’ (Finch, 2002 & 2009).  
 
3.2 MALAYSIA 
 
3.2.1 Philosophy and objectives of insolvency laws in Malaysia  
 
As far as Malaysia’s theoretical framework is concerned, the scholars and law practitioners in 
Malaysia have not given much attention to the normative theories of insolvency law. Moreover, the 
pragmatic way in which the law in Malaysia in general has developed through the years is among the 
factors that make it hard to state the Malaysian theoretical framework. Nevertheless, there are 
reports and studies that identified the underlying principles or philosophy of corporate insolvency 
law in Malaysia (Nathan, 2000; Kamarul & Little, 1997; Tomasic, 2006). These same reports and 
studies described the role of Malaysian corporate insolvency law as being similar to the Australian 
and English equivalents, and suggested that the role of corporate insolvency law of Malaysia would 
probably be better characterized as follows:  (i) to ensure the preservation and ranking of secured 
creditors’ rights and equal treatment of all other creditors where a company cannot be saved;  (ii) to 
provide rehabilitation where possible;  (iii) to punish delinquent officers who have contributed to the 
insolvency. It is claimed that the purpose and principles of insolvency laws in many different 
Western legal systems has been described by reference to such criteria as fairness, efficiency and 
impartiality, and it is believed that the role of the Malaysian insolvency law is similar to those 
jurisdictions (Tomasic & Whitford, 1997). 
 
3.2.2 Corporate Law Reform Committee (“CLRC”) 
 
As mentioned above, in Malaysia’s context, there might be no clear articulated philosophy on 
insolvency law. The Malaysian Government, realizing that the changes in insolvency law were based 
on pragmatism, lacking in a systematic as well as a proper theoretical foundation of corporate 
insolvency law and practice, finally formed the CLRC (under the umbrella of the Companies 
Commission of Malaysia (CCM) on 17 December 2003 to review the Malaysian corporate laws 
(include the law relating to insolvency) and it is the beginning of a comprehensive assessment on 
such laws in Malaysia. It should be noted that the formation of CLRC is to undertake a fundamental 
review of the current legislative policies on corporate law (as well as corporate insolvency) in order 
to propose amendments that are necessary for corporate and business activities to function in a 
cost-effective, consistent, transparent and competitive business environment in line with 
international standards of good corporate governance. The CLRC’s task and process includes among 
other things conducting studies in order to consider the existing corporate law and practices in 
Malaysia as well as other similarly concluded international practices.  
 
3.2.3 The objectives of corporate insolvency 
 
A starting point to look on the Malaysian objectives of corporate insolvency law is in the article 
entitled Reforming the Corporate Insolvency Law (CLRC, 2004) published by the secretariat of CLRC. 
Not much detail discussion has been articulated. Indeed, only general objectives of corporate 
insolvency have been articulated and unsurprisingly they are based on the writings of UK’s scholars 
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like Professor Goode and Ian Fletcher as well as Harmer Report of Australia (Harmer, 1988; Good, 
1990; Fletcher, 1996).  
 
As noted there is not much deliberate discussion or explanation on those objectives, but it has been 
argued that most of the general principles of corporate insolvency law mentioned above are found 
in company’s liquidation provision within the Companies Act (CA) 1965 (CLRC, 2004). CLRC 
acknowledged that the current framework is very much focused on the liquidation /winding up of 
company and indeed liquidation always is considered as the only viable option for companies facing 
financial difficulties (CLRC, 2004). CLRC in its attempt to review the current insolvency regime has 
stated that the underlying objectives and principles of insolvency law in Malaysia pointed out that 
the corporate insolvency regime should be able (CLRC, 2004): 
i. to wind up company business where there is no viable prospect of the business 
becoming profitable 
ii. to protect the rights of creditors and members ; especially in cases where the company 
is wound up on the grounds of insolvency 
iii. to make those responsible for mismanagement accountable for their actions; if the 
failure of a company’s business is due to mismanagement  these persons should be 
prevented in the future from setting up new companies 
iv. to enhance the accountability of those involved in the company’s management and 
liquidation process 
v. to restore the company to profitability: if a company’s failure is not contributed by 
mismanagement but due to temporary financial difficulties or external economic factors 
a rescue mechanism may enable the company to be rehabilitated and preserve its 
business as a going concern 
vi. to enable better returns for creditors and shareholders:  
In another consultative document released by CLRC (2004) it has been emphasized that the 
objective of the review of the corporate insolvency law in Malaysia is for the creation of a corporate 
insolvency framework: 
i. that is facilitative to the winding up of companies where there is no prospect of the business 
becoming profitable and viable; 
ii. that is able to provide an efficient system to rehabilitate companies where appropriate; 
iii. that is able to ensure the protection of rights of creditors and members by providing 
enforcement mechanisms that may be accessed without undue delay or difficulty; 
iv. that ensures accountability of the persons involved in the process and transparency of the 
process itself. 
The objectives mentioned above reflected some important elements of principles of corporate 
insolvency regime in Malaysia, namely to provide the efficient winding up process, to establish a fair 
and equitable system for the ranking of claims and the distributions of assets among creditors, to 
provide a framework to make those responsible for mismanagement accountable for their actions 
and to facilitate rescue/rehabilitation on companies facing financial difficulties. 
 
 
4. Underlying Principles of Corporate Insolvency: Is CLRC comparable to Cork Report?  
 
It is interesting to note that the arrangements of objectives set down by the CLRC are comparable to 
the Cork Report published by the Cork Committee. Generally, in some areas it seems that the CLRC 
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are correspond with the Cork Report. The two appear to be consensus that the aims/objectives of 
insolvency law are; to restore the company to profitability, to provide provisions of a fair system for 
the ranking of claims against the company, to ascertain the causes of company’s failures and the 
imposition of liability of those responsible for the failure and to ensure that there is an orderly 
realization and distribution of company’s assets.  
 
There are also situations where CLRC objectives seem to be similar with Cork, but in certain aspects 
there are some differences; 
i. First, Cork sets down that the objectives of the law is to protect interests of the 
insolvent and its creditors affected by insolvency while CLRC highlights that the law 
should protect the rights of creditors and members/shareholders especially in cases 
where the company is wound up on the grounds of insolvency.  
ii. Second, while Cork aims to recognize and safeguard the interests of society and 
other groups in society who are affected by insolvency, CLRC targets to protect the 
public from creditors who might in future engage in improper trading.  
iii. Third, CLRC points up another two measures to impose sanction for culpable 
management by its directors where it aims to enhance the accountability of those 
involved in the company’s management and liquidation process and the removal of 
powers of management of the company by its director but there are no equivalent 
measures under Cork. On the other hand Cork aims the insolvency law to identify 
and treat an imminent insolvency at an early stage rather than later, the purpose 
that has not got a place in the CLRC arrangement of insolvency objectives.   
 
Looking at the arrangements of the objectives of insolvency laws in Cork and CLRC it appears that 
their framework follows the multiple values approach where they point up insolvency law as being 
multi use. As discussed earlier there is always tension/conflict between those objectives and those 
tensions are hardly to be eliminated, yet these issues do not make the approach unacceptable. The 
Cork Report that was published more than twenty years earlier before CLRC embarked their review 
has strongly influenced CLRC in their comprehensive review on corporate insolvency and rescue in 
Malaysia. Compared to UK where the ‘rescue culture’ supported by Cork in the 80’s and since then 
stressed by the Government, Malaysia just started to promote ‘rescue culture’ but its ‘better late 
than never’ for the Government to do so.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The most controversial theory is the CWM and CB since these model look upon the role of 
insolvency law as evolving around the issue of creditors like protection of their interest and pre 
insolvency rights or distribution of the company’ assets among such creditors since they are 
considered financially directly affected by the corporate failure. Most of the remainder of the 
theories recognize that the role of insolvency law is not merely confined to maximizing returns to 
creditors, but to some other distributional role to play, for instance to rehabilitate or rescue 
businesses in financial difficulty and to protect employment, public interests and other victims’ 
interests affected by the corporation insolvency. It can be seen some thoughts advanced by the 
visions seem to have been incorporated into the statements of aims contained in the UK’s Cork 
Report and Malaysian CLRC that provide the foundation of the objectives of a good modern 
insolvency law. For UK and Malaysia, the arrays of Cork\CLRC objectives seem to endorse the 
aspects of communitarian and multiple values. Cork\ CLRC emphasized that insolvency law has to 
cater for the private interests of the insolvent, the creditors, the public and employees who are 
affected by company insolvency, and must give opportunities for continuation or rehabilitation of a 
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viable company. These concepts are considered a starting point for the promotion of ‘rescue culture’ 
in the UK\Malaysia. Indeed, to support such a scheme, Cork proposed the introduction of the 
administration and Company Voluntary Arrangement (CVA) (the two procedures were then 
introduced by the UK’s Insolvency Act (IA) 1986) to increase the survival chances of ailing companies 
facing financial difficulties. It should be noted that CLRC has came out with its Final Report in 2008 
entitled ‘Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLRC) Review of the Companies Act 1965’ and amongst 
others the recommendations are as following; i. the codification of the rights of secured creditors in 
the CA 1965; ii. the retention of section 292  of CA 1965 to ensure the protection of certain 
categories of unsecured creditors in a company under liquidation; iii.  increasing the quantum for 
wages and salary of employees entitled to priority in a winding up from the present RM1,500 to 
RM15,000; and iv. recommended the introduction of new corporate rehabilitation schemes in the 
forms of a Judicial Management (comparable to UK’s administration) and a CVA which has been a 
carbon copy from UK’s CVA.  In conclusion, unlike UK and US there is yet to be a body of literature 
on the theories of corporate insolvency in Malaysia. It is fair to say at this point in time the law  shall 
be developed in such a way to protect the interest of the creditors (secured and unsecured), 
employees and the survival of the life of the corporation, that is corporate rescue becomes the 
legitimate objectives of insolvency law.  
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